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Fried, Charles. An Anatomy of Values:
Problems of Personal and Social Choice,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1970.

Moral Feelings

In "The Sense of Justice" Rawls discusses how the principles of justice and fair play are related to what he calls moral feelings (such as guilt, shame, remorse, indignation, resentment) and what he calls natural attitudes (such as friendship, trust, love). And he discusses the relation of these moral feelings and natural attitudes to each other. According to this account moral feelings have the following three essential characteristics. First, they imply a disposition to engage in certain conduct, say, to make apology or offer restitution, to resolve to improve, or to pronounce blame, for the reason that such conduct is appropriate to the occasion, given a specified moral principle. Second, moral feelings imply the acceptance of moral principles. Guilt implies the acceptance of the principles of justice and fair play; shame implies a principle of excellence. In this way we can speak of the appropriate conduct being engaged in because of or out of an acceptance of a moral principle. Third, Rawls states that moral feelings "have necessary correlations with certain natural attitudes such as love, affection, and mutual trust and were a liability to have these feelings com-

pletely absent there would be an absence also of these natural attitudes."

The first two characteristics of moral feelings — let us call them their dispositional and their principled aspects — show that they bear a direct relation to the concept of rational ends which it has been the purpose of this inquiry to develop. What Rawls discusses from the perspective of this concept of justice and its ramifications I propose we view from the perspective of the concept of rational ends. Now the moral feelings which Rawls associates with justice, primarily guilt but also resentment and indignation, seem to be — in their dispositional and principled aspects — dispositions to accept and pursue certain rational ends, that is, justice and fair play. Rawls insists that the bodily and kinesthetic sensations (sinking feelings, palpitations, chills) are not necessary aspects of moral feelings, so the moral feeling must be the disposition to perform those rational actions which the rational end requires under the particular circumstances. Since the end is a rational end and the action a rational action, the subject of this disposition must understand both the rational principle and how it entails a concrete action in the specified circumstances.

Rawls asserts only that the liability to moral feelings (or at least those associated with the concept of justice and fair play) in the appropriate circumstances is necessary if one is to entertain certain natural attitudes: love, trust, loyalty, friendship. Thus the absence of these moral feelings entails an absence of love, trust, and friendship, and the presence of love, trust, and friendship entails the presence of the moral feelings. One who loves must be susceptible to feelings of guilt, and one who is insensible to guilt is insensible to love as well. What Rawls leaves open is the converse entailment: natural attitudes as entailed by moral feelings. Rawls is not prepared to maintain that one who is sensible to guilt and all the other feelings associated with a sense of justice is for that reason susceptible to love, friendship, and trust. I should like to show how these relationships and the concepts of emotions such as love, trust, and friendship may be elucidated if they are viewed from the perspective of rational actions and rational ends.

In the previous chapter the principle of morality was proposed as the remote rational principle of a whole family of ends, actions, and emotions. Its relation to the principles of justice and fair play,

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and therefore to moral feelings such as guilt and indignation, has
 already been developed. But these concepts — justice, fair play,
 guilt — are all rather juridical and cold concepts. They seem to
 express limitations on activity rather than occasions for positive
 expressions, although it would be commonly agreed that justice is
 a cardinal virtue, and acts of justice sometimes heroic. Love, trust,
 and friendship are more spontaneous, warm. Rawls calls them nat-
 ural attitudes and defines them in part as dispositions "to experi-
 ence and manifest . . . [certain] primary emotions" such as anger,
 joy, and fear in appropriate circumstances. Yet love, trust, and
 friendship, for all this, also depend on the principle of morality.

Love

With love more even than trust or friendship there can be no
 thought of counting on an accepted core of meaning in developing
 the concept. What I say about love therefore cannot be taken as
 expressing some core of meaning common to much of what has
 been thought and said on the subject. I shall here try to develop a
 conception of love which is consistent with at least one important
 tradition. According to this conception it is a necessary condition
 of love that the lover love his beloved for the sake of the beloved
 and not for the sake of something that the beloved can do for him.
 Thus if a person values another only because that other is useful
 to him, or even the source of pleasure by reason of appearance or
 manner, then the emotion and relation cannot count as love. For if
 a person's sole reason for valuing another is what that other can do
 for the person, then the object of the emotion (whatever that
 emotion is) is viewed as an instrument alone, a means only to the
 valuing person's end. He uses his object, for it is *only* in terms
 of the object's usefulness — in the broadest sense — to him that he
 values the object. What is lacking in this attitude is an appreciation
 of the other person as a personality, a recognition of the other per-
 son as an entity valuable in itself and quite apart from any advan-
 tage or pleasure to the valuing agent.

In the conception of love I put forward the lover must see in his
 object a source of value independent of his own ends and prefer-
 ences. In short, the lover must love the beloved for the beloved's
 own sake. Now the principle of morality provides a meaning for

the notion of respecting or valuing the personality of others as opposed to valuing some attribute pleasing to us. By virtue of the impartiality of the principle of morality an agent can give and another feel the assurance that the recognition he receives belongs properly to him and not to some attribute or product which the agent may find pleasing or useful. But surely love is not so impartial, and implies a valuing of the beloved not just as a bearer of human personality — which is what justice requires — but as a specific individual. Furthermore, respect and fair play can be demanded, they are entitlements. This is not true of love. From this I think we can see that although love is related to the principle of morality and the notion of respect for personality, the relation is a complex one. We might ask particularly how to account for the free and spontaneous aspect of love.

A solution lies in attributing (as Rawls does) to the principle of morality and the associated notion of respect a necessary but not a sufficient role in the structure of love. A person can be said to feel love or to act lovingly only if he first accepts and respects the personality of the beloved. Love, then, presupposes that the lover accept the beloved as an independent personality with a claim to his respect and to fair treatment from his beloved. Thus lover and beloved confront each other as persons. Love can exist only on the basis of the mutual recognition of personality which respect and morality express. The further element which makes the attitude one of love — the free and spontaneous element — has to do with freely and readily abandoning the entitlements accorded by the notion of respect and personality in favor of the interests of the beloved. This generosity and freedom are essential to love, but it is my point that generosity and freedom depend on the lover acknowledging the principles by which his own moral claims and entitlements, and those of other persons, are securely established. Only if he is secure in the sense of moral possession of these is he in a position to be generous and free, relinquishing what is his own. For one cannot give away what is not his own. But the very principles which accord to him his moral personality, entail the recognition of the moral entitlements and personality of others. Respect and self-respect are thus precisely correlated, and both are logical prerequisites of love.

I cannot and I do not pretend to present even in outline a com-

the personality of others as opposing to us. By virtue of the ability an agent can give and acknowledgment he receives belongs to the tribute or product which the beloved not just as a bearer of

justice requires — but as a subject and fair play can be demanded is not true of love. From this it is related to the principle of respect for personality, the relation is a matter of how to account for the free

laws does) to the principle of respect a necessary but not a sufficient condition. A person can be said to feel respect and respects the person, presupposes that the lover has a claim to respect on his beloved. Thus lover and beloved. Love can exist only on the condition of respect and recognition which makes the attitude reciprocal element — has to do with the renunciation of entitlements accorded by the lover in favor of the interests of the beloved. These are essential to love, but it is not dependent on the lover's actions, his own moral claims and entitlements, are securely established. The moral possession of these is held in common, relinquishing what is his own, not his own. But the very principles of respect for personality, entail the recognition of the personality of others. Respect and love are correlated, and both are logical

present even in outline a com-

plete analysis of the concept (or concepts) of love. My primary purpose is to establish the relation between that concept and what I have called the principle of morality. But if the argument I make on that point is to be convincing then I must show how it might be seen as part of a complete and intuitively acceptable concept of love. So far I have called attention only to the aspect of love which is the free resignation of claims and entitlements in favor of the beloved person. But this is too narrow and incomplete a conception. It is not clear how such a principle distinguishes love from friendship, which involves, in Aristotle's phrase, wishing another good for his own sake. Further, though the principle I have put forward gives a determinate sense to the freedom of love it is too abstract and leaves out of account the spontaneity of love. Finally, this principle seems excessively self-effacing, taking as its model perhaps parental love for a small infant, or some romantic picture of unreciprocated love, where the lover sacrifices himself for a beloved who may perhaps not even be aware of his existence.

Taking the last point first, I would agree that an important and perhaps the central conception of love between persons involves a notion of reciprocity, and that the self-effacing model represents an aberrant or developmental or at any rate special case. This central conception of reciprocity must be formalized not in terms of a free renunciation of entitlements to pursue one's own interests in order to take up the beloved's interests as one's own, but rather in terms of mutual sharing of interests. The dialectics of this conception seem to me, nevertheless, to show its dependence on the concept of morality. The two lovers surely make no claims on each other, yet what they do or give must be given in mutual recognition of the firm base of each other's personality. This interest which the lovers pursue, having abandoned self-interest, is not simply the reciprocal pursuit of the other's self-interest in place of one's own. That would be an absurdity. (One might call it the absurdity of pervasive altruism.) There is rather a creation of love, a middle term, which is a new pattern or system of interests which both share and both value, in part at least just because it is shared. This system of shared interests which the lovers create has as one of its defining principles that the contribution of each is free and spontaneous. In this way reciprocal love represents a kind of resolution of the paradoxes of self-interest and altruism. If this is an impor-

tant principle of reciprocal love, one might see why sexual love is both such an apt and such a fragile symbol and expression of mutual love. And incidentally one can at last see why I have tended to include sex in the category of rational ends.

As to the element of spontaneity, there is almost more difficulty. That the love relation should be a joyful one is obviously important and expresses the fact that love is not a logical exercise. But even joy is not an easy concept. I do not imagine I have exhausted it when I have pointed to the elements of readiness and absorption. Nevertheless something recognizable as the intuitive conception of love begins to emerge when we compound with the conception of mutual sharing the notions of a readiness on the part of the lovers to work, play, and do things together, that is, to engage in activities that are informed by the above principles, and to do so with an intensity about the engagement. In short, to the lover the mutual sharing of interest in love is very important, and this is shown by the place it occupies in the economy of his life. These ideas, at least, are wholly compatible with the conception of love as an emotion and a disposition having a rather elaborate rational structure — albeit the sense and grasp of this structure may be implicit and inchoate. And the very principles which give the concept its structure help explain the element of spontaneity, in that they hold that the gift of love must be bestowed freely and, as it were, arbitrarily, without entitlement. There is one conception of love with which this account is necessarily incompatible: that which holds that love in principle is devoid of a rational element.

Friendship

The foregoing should go some of the way in avoiding the objection that the conception of love I put forward fails to allow a distinction between love and friendship. For it seems to me that love and friendship are close in many respects, and that the important differences have to do with the degree of intensity and significance of the relation, and with the appropriate modes of expression. These differences may be acknowledged without denying that both love and friendship have a similar connection with the principle of morality. And that similarity is all that I care to propose concerning friendship.

Trust

Of the three concepts love, friendship, and trust, the easiest to relate to the concept of morality appears to be trust. Moreover, it is a more evidently rational, a more cognitive disposition than love or friendship. Is it not simply the recognition of a disposition in another and reliance upon it? To put that question is to reveal the complexity of the concept of trust. To be sure we have expressions such as "trust him to do that" where "that" may be a vile deed which we know to be in character for that person, or perhaps "that" may be having a fit of sneezing during a grand evening at the opera when he is a person given to sneezing in close proximity to perfumed ladies. But these usages are ironical and the central meaning of trust has to do not with *any* expectation at all pursuant to any disposition whatever.

The concept of trust does involve reliance on a disposition of another person, and it would seem to be an acceptable further specification of that concept to limit it to reliance on the disposition of another to act on the principle of morality, that is, to act justly and fairly when the occasion demands. But I suggest that even this fails to capture the essential structure of the concept of trust, for it suggests that a well-founded prediction that another will act on the principle of morality constitutes trust. What this misses is the reciprocal element in the concept, which requires that the one who trusts as well as the one who is trusted be disposed to act justly and fairly. Consider what justice and fairness require in respect to one who is *not* prepared to act justly or fairly to us. Justice and fairness require that a person forbear to pursue his own interests fully on the assumption that another will also do so and thus a scheme of cooperation will be established. They do not require that one forbear to pursue his interests *as if* the other would do so too, when there is good reason to believe that the other in fact will not do so. Thus fairness does not require that one abide by what appears to be a mutually cooperative scheme when one learns that in fact he is a victim of exploitation. To be sure morality requires a certain posture of respect and forbearance even toward the thoroughly untrustworthy individual, but it is enough to see that this is different from and less than what is required toward a normally trustworthy person.

In this regard trust exhibits the same reciprocity which characterizes the notion of respect and the principle of morality to which trust is related. Thus, if A trusts B, then he must expect of B that B trust him. But even this further requirement leaves the concept of trust at too cognitive a level, and fails to express fully its quality of reciprocity. For the above account would not distinguish between the case (1) where A relies on B's disposition to behave fairly toward A, which involves as we have seen a belief by A that B believes A is similarly disposed, *even if A in fact is not so disposed and is exploiting B*, and the case (2) which is the same as case 1 except that A is not only believed to be trustworthy, but actually is. The issue might be put thus: Can a thoroughly untrustworthy person adopt the attitude of trust or feel trust toward another? I deny that he can, and I would make the concept of trust sufficiently stringent to exclude an exploitative attitude or a mere neutral prediction. This can be done if the relation of trust to rational ends is brought in. To trust another is, in part, to have certain dispositions. These are dispositions to adopt ends scored by the principle of morality, to engage in actions involving others in which both may exhibit their mutual respect and their acceptance of the principle of morality. Thus trust, like love and friendship, is a creative attitude. Trust implies a disposition to engage in activities and adopt ends that are in part defined by the mutual acceptance of respect and morality. Moreover, trust like love and friendship is free, in the sense that ends and activities exhibiting morality are not in every case required by it. One can — as it were — invite another to participate in such an activity or not, without offending morality, and the other in some circumstances at least is free to accept or decline the invitation.

Trust is similar to love and friendship, then, in that it implies a disposition to adopt ends exhibiting respect for others and acceptance of the principle of morality. It is creative, leading to the free adoption of ends. Trust differs from love and friendship in that it is a colder, less spontaneous feeling or attitude. Trust is less intrusive than love or friendship. And trust is more functional.

Persons build relations on trust in part because this is useful in the accomplishment of other ends. But this is a subtle and crucial point. A cooperative endeavor built on trust may well be an effective way of attaining the ends of that endeavor, but it must be

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appreciated that the desire for those ends alone cannot sustain or
 account for the relation of trust. As was pointed out in the previous
 chapter, morality and moral relations are never completely coex-
 tensive with self-interest or utility. If a participant in a trust rela-
 tionship were solely interested in maximizing some set of interests
 and ends of his own, he would on occasion have sufficient reason
 to violate the moral relation, which here is the relation of trust.
 But it is the essence of moral relations and of trust relations that
 self-interest is not a sufficient reason for breaching them. Thus a
 person in a cooperative, trust relation pursues certain interests out-
 side of the relation — as do lovers and friends — but he accepts
 the terms of the relation as a constraint on those pursuits. Now in
 the account I have presented, these constraints are not simply nega-
 tive elements. They express positive values, concrete ends, and
 those values and ends have an independent status.

To be moral is also an end in itself. (As Kant puts it, morality is
 a good.) That is why we accept the constraints of morality, indeed
 it is the only reason why we should. And applying this generality
 to the case of trust we see that trust relations involve the pursuit
 of other ends, supported by and subject to the constraints of trust.
 This means that in those relations trust is an end in itself. It is an
 end which would be empty, purely formal, devoid of substantive
 content, but once that content is supplied by other ends, trust and
 its forms becomes an end in itself. So the affirmation of human
 personality implicit in trust is not only a means to other ends;
 through those other ends, it is itself an end of independent sig-
 nificance. Thus even if we could achieve our other ends as well or
 better apart from trust relationships, we would have reason to pur-
 sue them in the context of trust. In trust the functional relation
 may loom larger, and the relation be limited to certain pursuits,
 but their analysis shows the affinity between trust and love or
 friendship. Trust can be limited to the particular matter at hand,
 and does not imply a disposition to seek more and more mutually
 shared ends. Thus, one can trust persons for whom one has neither
 love nor liking, although friendship and love imply, at least in the
 standard cases, trust as well.

Love, Friendship, Trust, and the Ordering of Ends

It will be recalled that Rawls has stated that "the absence of certain moral feelings [for example, guilt, a sense of justice] implies the absence of certain natural attitudes [for example, love, trust, friendship]; or, alternatively, that the presence of certain natural attitudes implies a liability to certain moral feelings." Rawls declines to draw the converse implication that, say, a sense of justice implies a liability to feel love, trust, or friendship. The foregoing account supports Rawls's conclusions. For I have argued that love, friendship, and trust imply morality as a necessary condition. It shows why morality is only a necessary not a sufficient condition for these feelings, why the converse implication does not work. Love, friendship, and trust—in varying degrees—go beyond morality. The principle of morality is formal, it places limitations on what may be done, and in accepting those limitations for their own sake a person exhibits respect for others. Thus, acting on the principle of morality is both necessary and sufficient for respect. But love, friendship, and trust are more positive dispositions. They imply seeking out and creating occasions where ends may be pursued exhibiting acceptance of the principle of morality in various complex ways. In short, trust, friendship, and love, go beyond morality, to exhibit the elements of respect and reciprocity in ever more substantial and pervasive ways. While these three concepts imply morality, morality does not imply them. It is at least not logically incoherent to imagine a person who accepts the principle of morality but neither loves, trusts, nor feels friendship, although such a person would be a very cold and odd person indeed.

The discussion must now return to the concepts of rational ends and rational actions. The principle of morality was introduced as one particularly potent and pervasive rational principle. In the discussion of the concepts of justice and fair play it was shown how these rational concepts mediate the abstract principle of morality and finally determine concrete ends and concrete actions. Thus morality, justice, and fair play all provide examples of rational ends and rational actions whose performance constitute those ends.

Love, friendship, and trust provide further examples of how ends in themselves are structured by rational principles. Each of these

Ordering of Ends

is stated that "the absence of guilt, a sense of justice] implies [for example, love, trust, the presence of certain natural in moral feelings." Rawls definition that, say, a sense of justice, or friendship. The foregoing. For I have argued that love, as a necessary condition. It is necessary not a sufficient condition. The implication does not work. In varying degrees — go beyond the formal, it places limitations on those limitations for their respect for others. Thus, acting on the necessary and sufficient for respect. More positive dispositions. They are positions where ends may be pursued. The principle of morality in various forms of friendship, and love, go beyond respect and reciprocity in every way. While these three concepts do not imply them. It is at least not a person who accepts the principle, nor feels friendship, although an odd person indeed.

As to the concepts of rational ends, the principle of morality was introduced as a positive rational principle. In the case of justice and fair play it was shown that the abstract principle of moderate ends and concrete actions. Justice, friendship, and fair play all provide examples of ends whose performance constitute

and further examples of how ends are ordered by rational principles. Each of these

implies a disposition to adopt certain ends and pursue certain activities. These — as in the case of justice and fair play — are rational ends and activities, first because of their common dependence on the formal principle of morality, but also because of their specific concretization of that principle in the various forms of reciprocity which structure and exemplify each of these dispositions. This formal, rational element I have sought to bring out in the dialectics of love and trust.

Love, friendship, and trust differ from morality, fair play, and justice in that terms like love primarily designate a disposition to adopt certain ends and to perform actions constitutive of those ends. They do not directly designate those ends and actions, whereas justice, morality, and fair play more nearly do. An act of love, of trust, or of friendship is more of a philosophical construct — though a perfectly valid one — than is an act of justice, a just act or an unfair act. But this should not detract at all from the argument that love and trust ultimately refer to rational ends. In justice or fair play the direct focus on a concrete act is more appropriate because these are more juridical concepts, and an action involving others either accords with or violates them. Love, on the other hand, can rarely be identified and rarely appears in respect to a single discrete action. Where there is love, it tends to spread, to pervade, to assume dominance in the long-term pattern of ends pursued. Nevertheless it is the end and the principle constituting it which is love.

Finally, I should like to make explicit what has been implicit in this chapter: how love, friendship, and trust not only constitute ends in themselves but entail an ordering of ends. These relations depend on the principle of morality — there cannot be such relations without an acknowledgment of that more general principle. And these more concrete entailments, as I argued in Chapter Four, provide a reason for being moral: unless one is moral one cannot pursue those ends, stand in such relationships, or feel such emotions. And to acknowledge morality is already to accept an ordering of one's ends, for morality is a universal and categorical principle.

But as I have argued in this chapter these relationships imply further orderings. Trust, while less universal than morality, has implications beyond one particular end — a person who is in a

relation of trust may be constrained in a whole range of actions over a considerable period of time. Love is even more exigent, for to love another is not just to pursue a particular end at a particular time. It is to assign a certain significance to that relation. It means that in the whole pattern of one's ends, those implicated in the love relation will stand very high, perhaps have first priority. One does not love unless he devotes considerable life resources — time, energy, even risk of death as I argue in Part Three — to that relation. And this significance of love can only be exhibited by a willingness to order one's total repertoire of ends in certain ways, and to assign certain priorities. It is striking that such an ordering — the ordering of love — is a disposition which is exhibited not only over time as one views the choices and patterns of man's life, but in a particular case when he chooses to pursue this rather than that end. Friendship is a similar but less exigent case.

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Chapter VI
The System of Ends:
The Concept of the Life Plan

Fried, Charles. An Anatomy of
Values: Problems of Personal and Social
Choice. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA; 1970.

In this chapter I shall first discuss several categories of ends other than moral ends, that seem to me to be of a similar order of significance. I do not intend to consider the complete repertoire of available human ends, but I do hope thereby to give a fuller sense of the diversity and number of ends in that repertoire. I shall then go on to consider the problem of establishing an ordering among ends.

At various points in the preceding discussion I have adverted to or assumed the existence of other ends (indeed other rational ends) than those necessarily related to the principle of morality. I am less prepared to generalize about these other ends. They are a vast, heterogeneous array, and no very perspicuous system of relationships can be demonstrated. Nevertheless certain very rough categories may be suggested, and a modicum of structure discerned in at least some of these categories. These very rough categories of ends I shall call knowledge, art, instinct, and survival. It is apparent at once that this is indeed a mixed bag.

Knowledge and art, although difficult in detail, clearly enough refer to the ends of knowing and of creating or appreciating beautiful objects. Instinct is a much more dubious category, in-

cluding appetites and drives such as hunger, thirst, sex, protection of the young. Survival is an even more dubious category, and a hard one to distinguish from the instinctual. In it I include all the ends we pursue not from an immediate instinct, but from a more or less rational understanding that their pursuit is necessary to our survival and growth — thus I would include eating when one is not hungry, medical care, training in skills.

Knowledge as a Rational End

The philosophical tradition recognizing knowledge as an end is more venerable than the recognition of the ends associated with morality. For all that, it is a less popular subject of analysis as an end than it once was. Indeed, the advance of certain psychological theories has made the very notion of knowledge as an end seem problematic. For instance, there is the psychoanalytic account of scientific curiosity as possibly being rooted in infantile sexual curiosity, or as perhaps being a hypostasis of the need — located in the activity of the ego — of a person to assert himself by attaining a sense of mastery over his environment. On this view scientific curiosity about processes, which realistically there is no chance of controlling, yields a sense of control which comes from an understanding of those processes. Thus there is something magical about the very springs of scientific activity.

Whatever the validity of such psychological theories of how persons come to have certain ends — here the attainment of understanding — it seems to me that it would be a mistake to deny on that basis the autonomous character of this end. It is not as if this theory allowed us to say with confidence that the mature scientist now passionately engaged in testing the validity of the general theory of relativity could be satisfied in some very different way designed also to give "a sense of mastery over the environment." Whatever the original source of the passion, it seems very implausible to treat this end as anything other than an independent end, which has split off from what may have been its origins. It seems far sounder to assume that the knowledge he seeks he may at least sometimes seek simply for its own sake.

In contrast to morality (with its associated concepts) knowledge may appear very much like a game. As a rational end it has the

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logical structure necessary for coherence, but it appears to lack the
urgency and weight of morality, which is the general principle of
all our relations with other persons. For rational structure without
significant content is almost a definition of at least some games.
But knowledge is not a game, and in grasping why it is not, a
point about rational ends should come clearer. The form of the
various moral ends, their rational coherence, places them in the
category of rational ends, but it is the substance this form organizes
that gives them their significance. So in the case of knowledge we
must seek to identify the corresponding substance. Knowledge has
as its substance all reality as it may be conceived to be external
to the agent. In moral ends the point of the encounter is a certain
form of interaction between agent and object — as in acts of justice
or love. The end of knowledge, by contrast, requires the agent to
abstract from his own characteristics as much as possible, so he sees
his object just as it is. The agent may be forced to become aware
of his relation to the object known, but the end in view requires
this awareness only so as to allow a more complete abstraction of
self from the activity. (Of course, knowledge can make the self an
object of knowledge, in which case the self must seek to abstract
itself as agent from the end which is the self as object.)

Thus knowledge is a more inclusive end than morality, since the
range of objects which can plausibly be involved in moral ends is
restricted. It is restricted to other moral agents. Indeed knowledge
appears as a more basic end than morality in the sense that if the
issue arises, morality cannot shrink from knowledge. It is a part
of love, friendship, or trust to want to know its object. It is, to be
sure, a commonplace that love is blind. But this is a mistake, at
least as regards the concept of love — and the associated concepts
— developed in the previous chapter. According to these, the object
is valued for its own sake, and this entails a conception of the
object as it is, that is, the argument entails knowledge of the object.
To see in a beloved object only what one wants to see is related
to valuing it only in the light of one's own interests and not for
its own sake. On the other hand, knowledge does not require love.
Indeed, it is part of the notion of knowledge that the conception
of the object be abstracted as much as possible from the knower.

Moreover, the end of knowledge and the capacity and disposition
to pursue that end are as significant to a person's conception of

himself as are the ends associated with morality. Indeed, here it might be said that knowledge is more basic. In knowing ourselves to have an interest and a capacity to attain knowledge we take a position in respect to all possible objects including ourselves. We distinguish between things as they are and what we want of them, and are prepared to conceive of and pursue our ends under the constraint that objects enter into our ends as they are. The stance is so basic, indeed, that it is hard to say more about it than that it is a sense of reality, of reality as ineluctable and not subject to our wants, and that it is a sense of ourselves as a part of reality. Indeed it is only this stance that makes possible the concept of reality. Whether or not this point can be formulated further, the foregoing should suffice to indicate why the rational end I call knowledge, which is the attainment of a fuller appreciation of external reality as such, is a significant end.

Art

Aesthetic activity and appreciation seem to fit the conception of a rational end more readily and intuitively than any of the examples discussed.* That this is an activity pursued for its own sake and constituted by its structure is relatively obvious, and correspondingly the assertion that *really* some independently identifiable end is being pursued in this activity to which art stands in the relation of means to end seems most arbitrary or doctrinaire. Indeed there is the danger that the case for art as an end in itself is so strong that it seems inapplicable in other instances. Art is a paradigm of the rational end. But the conception of rational end applies as well, I have tried to show, in cases of knowledge and morality. That there is this common structural element in knowledge and art is a point that is often made in various ways, particularly where the art is relatively formal and the knowledge sought relatively abstract and theoretical.

I find it difficult in the case of art to say anything which is both general and perspicuous about the kinds of formal structure specific to art or about the kinds of material which these structures organize. Knowledge is a set of ends directed to reality as such, and morality a set of ends directed to other moral persons as such.

* See also the discussion of aesthetic ends in Chapter Three.

with morality. Indeed, here it is basic. In knowing ourselves to attain knowledge we take objects including ourselves. They are and what we want of and pursue our ends under our ends as they are. The hard to say more about it than as ineluctable and not subject to ourselves as a part of reality. It makes possible the concept of which can be formulated further, the why the rational end I call of a fuller appreciation of it end.

seem to fit the conception of intuitively than any of the activity pursued for its own sake relatively obvious, and correlate independently identifiable to which art stands in the arbitrary or doctrinaire. In use for art as an end in itself in other instances. Art is a conception of rational end, in cases of knowledge and structural element in knowledge made in various ways, formal and the knowledge sought

to say anything which is both ends of formal structure specific to which these structures oriented to reality as such, and other moral persons as such.

Chapter Three.

What is the corresponding general relation of artistic ends to the objects of the activities in which these ends are pursued? My inability to answer this question generally does not suggest to me that there are no distinctions to be made between art and other ends. Thus, though art may, perhaps, be related to play, as a class of rational ends art is more significant and substantial. What is this significance and substance? I would suggest very tentatively that art unlike play imposes its particular category of coherence on significant substance, even the substance of other rational ends. Art may take as its substance love, friendship, and the violation of these, or our perception and knowledge of external reality. But it is also true that artistic forms are significant as such, as artistic forms.

Instinctual Ends

It is the most familiar of commonplaces that men have certain instinctual drives — hunger, sex, aggression, maternal love — and that one of the basic categories of ends is the satisfaction of these instinctual drives. How are these to be located in the general conception of ends I have been developing? Certainly my emphasis on the rational should not be taken as denying their existence or peculiarly insistent quality. But there are very great problems about the concept of drive, desire, instinct, satisfaction, and the like. And neither philosophers nor psychologists have reached anything like agreement about them. I have so far avoided these controversies by considering ends that men do in fact pursue, the structure and relations of those ends, and the systematic implications of having or not having one or another class of ends. Without denying the seriousness of the ancient controversies, I propose to continue in that vein.

Eating, sex, and maternal love all refer to acts and ends pursued on particular, concrete occasions. Whatever else can be said about these instinctual drives, it seems correct to assert that these drives can be viewed as a disposition to pursue the relevant ends in the appropriate circumstances and to feel the relevant emotions and feelings. Moreover, as I have argued in Chapter Three, it is hard to conceive of many significant instances of ends and actions involving these instincts that do not also involve significant rational

elements. Finally, to the extent that the pursuit of these ends impinges on others — and it always will in a remote or direct way — they must be consistent with the principle of morality and its derivatives. What, then, can be said of these ends as ends? Are they ends at all?

I suggest that there is no need to be intimidated by this class of ends — if it is a class — just because it has received considerable attention from scientists and because some theorists would somehow reduce all human behavior to the satisfaction of the desires associated with it. There is, to be sure, the notion by which desire is associated with an end, on the analogy of some sort of physical force impelling behavior. But if, as I have proposed, desires are viewed as dispositions to pursue certain ends in appropriate circumstances, the contrast to the various rational ends I have been discussing disappears. For morality, love, trust, fairness, art, knowledge, and play are ends which are related to dispositions to pursue those ends as much as are sex or eating. Moreover dispositions to pursue ends such as love or fairness or knowledge are significant, for what dispositions one has and lacks are crucial to what sort of being one is, what sort of person, and whether a person at all. I can think of no reason to conceive of the instinctual dispositions otherwise. A person who is or is not disposed to pursue sexual ends, to display parental affection, indeed to eat or drink, is or is not a particular kind of being. It is our ends — including our instinctual ends — that define us.

What then of the desire, the need? To the agent, who is defined by the ends he pursues, palpable desire, I think, appears as several things. It recalls to him an end that he has, but it recalls it to him as an end — that is, it does not simply recall to him the *fact* that he entertains in the repertoire of his ends such and such an end. It is also a necessary prelude to the fulfillment of that end, for without desire the activity is not pursued as an end in itself but as a means to some other end. Finally, desire is part of the end itself. The end is constituted by an orchestration of gestures, sensations, and perceptions extended in time, and palpable desire is an early constituent of the totality. To desire an end is in part what is meant by having that end. Once again there seems to be no reason here to conceive of instinctual desires and the ends associated with them differently from the desire to play, to hear

music or write poetry, to show kindness or love, or to restore unjustly acquired property.

Is no distinction to be made, then, between the rational ends I have been discussing and these instinctual ends? Since my focus in this essay is on ends and values as they appear to a person having those ends and values, the familiar distinctions in terms of greater or lesser similarities to lower animals, in terms of the ontogeny of these dispositions, in terms of the neurophysiology of these dispositions (are the drive centers cortical or peripheral), are quite irrelevant. The distinctions that are important from my point of view have to do with the prominence of the rational element, and their relative givenness.

Instinctual ends involve less of a rational element than do ends like morality, art, play, or knowledge. Although instinctual ends are complex, ordered wholes, as I have argued, yet the ordering is one the understanding of which has less effect on our understanding of the end as an end, on what it is about the value that makes it valuable. A statement of the ordering, of the principle, is less a statement of a principle we subscribe to than it is a description of what we do. As a statement or a principle it is external to us — although the ordering and the end itself are our own. I have not been absolute about this because many of the instinctual ends — sex, food, maternal love — have a considerable rational element in them, for instance, as regards the choice and perception of their objects. More important, these instinctual ends are themselves constrained and incorporated in various ways by the rational ends I have been discussing — for example, sex or maternal love in "rational" love.

This explains what I mean by the relative givenness of these ends and dispositions. They are given because in our experience of our selves as purposive beings, the instinctual ends appear more nearly imposed on us by our nature than do our rational ends, which we feel more closely to have chosen. This may provide an interpretation of Kant's argument that these ends represent the order of heteronomy, while rational ends are autonomous values. But I am dubious about considering this aspect of our nature as less our own than rational dispositions.

What is most interesting about instinctual ends from the point of view of this essay is the way in which they are incorporated

into and ordered as elements of rational ends by the rational principles of those ends. Thus maternal love can become the occasion for the relation of rational love. Sex can become a means of expressing love or friendship, it can be the kind of shared, mutually created end which is the substance of love. An instinctual end like sex is given, and much of what will count as sex is given, but the rational end of love defines the occasions, objects, and mode of pursuit of that end. In the same general way art and play as rational ends may incorporate instinctual ends — eating, the pleasure of combat, smell and touch, and again sex.

Survival

There comes now a residual category of ends which I refer to as the general category of survival. The concept is unsatisfactory, but some provision in the conceptual system of ends is necessary for the phenomena I shall identify. There are a vast number of activities — for example, eating again but under different circumstances, flight from danger, provisions of shelter, relief from pains and ills of various sorts. These cannot be said to be pursued for their own sake as can the rational and instinctive activities already discussed. Where activities are pursued with a more or less conscious purpose in mind — wood is collected and a fire made in order to provide warmth — they are again quite unproblematical. But what of activities — like flight from danger or eating without pleasure — where the end, survival or security, need not be consciously adverted to, and may indeed never present itself at all to the agent? Of these activities — unlike instinctive ends — it would be true that the agent would prefer that the occasion for them would never arise. Perhaps the correspondence between an instinctive end like sexual activity and a survival activity like flight is this. In both cases there is an end which is postulated by the agent. In the former that end is the activity itself; in the latter the end is not constituted by any activity, but rather is a state which calls forth activity only to bring it about or to maintain it. The end in both cases, however, is quite instinctive in the sense that it is not constituted by a rational principle. It is only because in the case of behavior like flight the end is instinctive while the activities that bring it about may be more or less deliberate and “plotted” that these activities appear to be ends in themselves. I

nal ends by the rational principle can become the occasion for love. Love can become a means of exchange of the kind of shared, mutually beneficial love. An instinctual end like sex count as sex is given, but the occasions, objects, and mode of pursuit are a general way art and play as instrumental ends — eating, the pleasure of sex again sex.

category of ends which I refer to. The concept is unsatisfactory, a rational system of ends is necessary. There are a vast number of ends but under different circumstances of shelter, relief from pains cannot be said to be pursued for and instinctive activities already pursued with a more or less concentrated and a fire made in the house again quite unproblematical. Freedom from danger or eating without fear or security, need not be considered never present itself at all — unlike instinctive ends — it is preferred that the occasion for the correspondence between an end and a survival activity like flight and which is postulated by the instrumental activity itself; in the latter the occasion is a state which is sought about or to maintain it. The instrumental end is instinctive in the sense that it is a principle. It is only because in the instrumental end is instinctive while the instrumental end is more or less deliberate and instrumental to be ends in themselves. I

suspect that it is by using these survival cases as a paradigm for the relation of act to end that one might come to believe that all activity is instrumental to some separately identifiable end state like "well-being" or survival.

I believe that survival may also appear as an element, as raw material, to be ordered in other, more complex, rational ends. First, survival is importantly constrained by morality — we seek survival for ourselves and others subject to the constraints of morality. Also we desire the survival of those to whom we stand in relations of love, and we may decrease the chances of our own survival for the sake of those we love. More striking, the whole attitude we take toward survival — for what we shall live, for what we shall die or take the risk of dying, and when — is determined by the overall coherence and ordering we impose on our various ends. This subject, how our rational life plan effects our decisions as to survival, as to life and death, is the subject of Part Three of this essay.

Relations and Priorities among Ends

In economic theory and modern decision theory the problem of ordering is solved by the technique of maximization. A person's preferences and priorities among his ends are ascertained and an ordinal or cardinal ranking is thereby established. This ranking is obtained either by observation of behavior or by direct inquiry, and weights are assigned by such methods as determining preferences among lottery tickets carrying various ends as more or less probable outcomes. Then, assuming only transitivity and a few other weak rationality criteria, a complete set of priorities is thought to ensue for any circumstance, on the assumption that the actor desires to maximize the sum of his utilities so weighted.

I should emphasize that I have absolutely no quarrel with this technique so far as it goes, but I also believe that it does not go far enough. I am not concerned with the notion that rational men may be thought to assign weights to their preferences and then seek to maximize their sum.* What I wish to do is to discover why

* Robert Nozick points out that "it may always be possible to produce a gimmicky real-valued function such that its maximization mirrors one's moral views [whatever they may be] in a particular area." "Moral Complications and Moral Structures," *Natural Law Forum*, 12 (1968): 3.

a person, having certain ends and values, will assign them certain weights, and why and how those assignments of weight will differ in particular circumstances. Now on these points utility theory and decision theory have nothing to say, for it takes values, ends, tastes, or preferences, and the weights assigned to them, as given, and works out the consequences of those given items. In this essay I have been seeking to unpack the internal structure of those ends and values and thus to show if possible why a particular value requires that it be assigned a certain weight. Thus, a person bound by a serious obligation of fidelity may choose ("prefer") to discharge that obligation in the face of considerable hardships and temptation. Utility theory would record only the weight he attaches to that end relative to the benefits he must forgo and the costs he must incur. (Utility theory may conclude that he assigns it absolute weight.) This is sound and valid, but it does not ask why he assigns that weight to obligation. The account of the value of fairness and of its relation to other ends should elucidate that further question.

Orderings and priorities among ends have been generated by the discussion in the previous chapters in two ways. First, certain ends entail priorities over other inconsistent ends. Thus justice entails a priority over ends related to or ordered by a principle of utility maximizing, and fairness and friendship entail priorities of various often complex sorts over other ends related to what might be called self-interest. In short, justice or love means that a person will order his priorities in certain ways. A person who has no time or resources to devote to his beloved simply does not love; a man who always prefers his own advantage to that of others is not a just or fair man.

Second, certain ends incorporate other ends within themselves, and thus express themselves as orderings of these other ends. Love again is an excellent example, for love not only pushes competing ends into a position of lesser priority, but also takes up certain ends and lends to them a special significance and priority. Art and knowledge also take up other ends and interests as their subject matter. Anything at all may be the subject of a dispassionate inquiry or a literary account or artistic rendering. But the relationships that may exist are more complex than this too. One may, for instance, seek a better understanding of another out of love for

values, will assign them certain assignments of weight will differ from these points utility theory and for it takes values, ends, tastes, assigned to them, as given, and assigned given items. In this essay I discuss the internal structure of those ends and it is possible why a particular value is assigned weight. Thus, a person bound by a principle of utility may choose ("prefer") to discontinue a course of considerable hardships and endure only the weight he attaches to the end he must forgo and the costs he must incur. It is possible to conclude that he assigns it absolute weight, but it does not ask why he assigns it that weight on the account of the value of fairness; it should elucidate that further

ends have been generated by the principle in two ways. First, certain ends are generated by different ends. Thus justice entails ends ordered by a principle of utility and friendship entail priorities of various kinds related to what might be called a principle of utility. This means that a person will order his ends in a way that a person who has no time or opportunity to do so does not; a man who loves his neighbor as himself that of others is not a just or

order of other ends within themselves, but the orderings of these other ends. Love and friendship not only pushes competing ends, but also takes up certain ends of significance and priority. Art and friendship and interests as their subject matter and the subject of a dispassionate intellectual rendering. But the relationship between them is more complex than this too. One may, for example, order the ordering of another out of love for

that other person, and not in order to render some loving service, but just because knowledge of the beloved is desirable to the lover as a lover. So also with art the relationship between art and some other end involved in it may be complex. It would seem particularly in regard to instinctual ends, sensuous pleasures, there may be an imposition of rational structure which is art, and in those cases sensuous pleasure is more than simply the subject of art, as it may be simply the dispassionate subject of knowledge.

In general, then, the significant rational ends and systems of ends have very considerable implications for the way a person orders his priorities among his ends. To have those ends just is to have a certain order and priority among one's ends; it just is to have a certain kind of life plan. But there is a different point that emerges from this as well. It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter Three that one of the important aspects of rational ends was their very rationality, the very order and coherence they imposed on the disparate materials that they ordered. I suggested there that among the ends or dispositions men might have is this very disposition to order, rationality, coherence. In this way it is a value of justice, of love, and very definitely of art that it does order the chaotic and disparate materials of our existence into coherent wholes.

The question I would ask finally is whether the order implicit in the ends I have discussed is a complete order, whether it completely determines the structure of our lives. I think that these ends do not. Morality and the moral relations certainly pervade all our lives and particular ends, but one can be thoroughly moral and yet order one's life in a vast number of different ways; moreover, one can love without thereby also determining all of one's existence. And art is limited to particular artistic acts and appreciation. There is still a great deal that is left indeterminate, unstructured. I would like to suggest now a notion that takes up all our ends — morality, love, knowledge, and the rest — and seeks or tends to organize them all into a single, coherent whole, into a rational life plan.

The Concept of the Life Plan

Morality, love, and friendship imply an ordering of ends. But it is only a partial ordering, and the question arises whether

beyond these incomplete structures any more complete ordering of ends exists. There is reason to believe that such further ordering is present. Consider the conception of human personality that would emerge if there were no ordering of ends, if our behavior and preferences as to art and knowledge, instinct and survival, were totally random. This randomness would go deep, since whom we loved, whom we befriended, and what moral obligations we undertook would also be an entirely random matter. Nor would this randomness take the form of a random choice of an ordering in which objects of love, concern for art, or for knowledge, or for objects of instinct would be contained and ordered. I am proposing for consideration the stronger case where, subject only to the constraints of morality and moral relations, there is no pattern or consistency whatever in the ends we pursue. Our interest in art or knowledge, the kinds of things that please us, even the objects of our love would change frequently and unpredictably. This is what it would mean to entertain rational ends, but to have no ordering (apart from that implicit in morality and the moral relations) of those ends themselves. This is what it would mean if the arrangement of our ends over time were entirely random.

It seems clear that such a picture is incompatible with both our experience of ourselves and of others, and with the notions of rationality I have been developing. Persons are comprehensible both to themselves and others, but a creature whose ends and values varied randomly would not be comprehensible. We can only understand that in which we can discern some pattern or order. A randomly varying person is one who could make no plans, who could neither develop skills and depth nor take advantage of them if he did. Similarly, others could not make plans in respect to such a person. Indeed, I would say that our concept of ourselves and others as persons with a continuing, coherent identity over time depends in part on our exhibiting some order and consistency in our values and ends. Josiah Royce makes the same point when he writes that "a person, an individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan." *

The point goes deeper. Even the pursuit of particular ends assumes some order and consistency. Intellectual and aesthetic performances in particular cases depend on a background of developed

* *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908), p 168.

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 certain sort of person, and that means that we can know what
 counts and will count as significant ends for such a person over
 fairly protracted periods of time. For these reasons it seems clear
 that persons must and do exhibit some order, some consistency in
 their ensemble of ends, that their ends as a whole comprise a
 system. I shall call this order the life plan.

The ordering of the life plan could be of two sorts. It could be
 a pattern discerned by an outside observer seeking to arrive at a
 predictive theory about another's preferences and behavior; a per-
 son could also observe himself and perhaps arrive at a predictive
 theory about his values and choices in the future. But the pattern
 could be of a different sort, the sort that I have described as order-
 ing the elements within a particular end. The life plan could be
 a rational principle, a score which the person knows, under-
 stands, and follows as a plan or principle of his own. In other
 words the life plan might be a general rational principle for order-
 ing ends, just as there are particular rational principles for par-
 ticular ends. There are two considerations that lead me to suggest
 that the life plan is of the latter sort, and that the coherence it
 provides is what I have been calling rational coherence.

First, the life plan must order a set of complex and disparate
 rational ends. The very complexity of ends, such as those involved
 in relations of love and trust or those involved in artistic creation,
 means that if those ends are to be realized there must be elaborate
 and conscious planning at least of an instrumental sort. This
 deliberate planning presupposes not only stability but some com-
 patibility of the ends provided for. This stability and compatibility
 imply a system of ends of which the person must be aware, if
 he is to plan in terms of it. So that finally we come to ask whether
 having accepted the existence of particular rational ends and of a
 conscious deliberate plan to realize those ends, it is plausible at the
 same time to consider the ordering and priority of those ends as
 something which the person does not understand and experience
 as his own. Just as the rational principles of ends are one's own,
 and not mere predictive entities, just so their relative importance,
 their relative urgency, and hence their ordering and priorities are
 experienced as one's own.

This does not mean that the life plan and the coherence it provides are necessarily freely chosen, that we choose and make up our life plans, as it were, *ad lib*. It may well be that the major structures — or some of them — of our priorities are biologically or psychologically determined, but this may also be the case with the whole system of moral principles, principles of games, logic, and art. I have never argued that the test for the rationality of a principle is its ontogeny. The test rather is the way we regard the principle once it is brought to consciousness. Now I do wish to suggest that there may be considerable *ad lib* creativeness in respect to life plans, and that to the extent that we can be said to choose a life plan we can be said also to choose ourselves, to choose who we are. But the rationality of the life plan does not depend on the existence of such a freedom of choice.

The foregoing leads to the second reason for supposing the life plan is a rational plan, a most general rational principle. The capacity to impose rational order on ends is necessary to morality, to knowledge, to art. In general these rational ends suggest a disposition for order as such, a disposition to transform contingent, arbitrary matter into rationally ordered systems. The suggestion in this section is that this formal capacity, which is exhibited in various discrete rational ends and in systems of ends, also appears as a disposition to impose order and system for its own sake. This general disposition is exhibited in respect to the life plan, the ordering of ends. The disposition to impose this highest-order rationality is neither moral nor theoretic (that is, related to the end of knowledge), and indeed it bears closest resemblance to the aesthetic, for it is in aesthetic ends that order is imposed on disparate materials for the sake of order itself. And thus it might be said that man has a disposition to make of his whole life an artistic creation.

The picture that emerges is of man as a rational animal, in the sense that his world and instincts are pervaded by a tendency to system, to rational coherence. There is a tendency to order the whole repertoire of ends a man pursues, to make inclusive coherent wholes. This is the drive for coherence, and if any unitary end can plausibly be suggested, it is not some end like pleasure, but coherence, in which all material elements are made part of a single, unified system.

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I do not go so far as to assert that all our ends, desires, and emotions do in fact make up one single, perfect, and coherent system. We are aware that they do not, that there is a large element of conflict and discontinuity in our lives. A person whose system of ends formed a completely coherent system, whose every end was part of one single end, whose every action was a gesture in a single unified action, might be as strange to us, I suppose, as a person whose actions and tastes were largely lacking in coherence. I suppose we would say of the first sort of person that he lacked life, spontaneity. On the other hand, a person whose ends and principles lacked a coherence even beyond that of morality would also present a flawed and puzzling aspect. A person who did love, who was faithful to all his obligations, and yet exhibited no further coherence and pattern in his ends and dispositions would be a vacillating and elusive being. We could not feel we knew him as we know real persons. And the fact that he exhibited the other traits of personality and lived up to our moral expectations of him would make such a person not less but more puzzling. That is because, his having so much of human comprehensibility about him, we would be puzzled that he fell apart at the center, as it were.

There is, finally, the question of the form of the life plan. Can an account, even as general a one as that offered for morality, love, trust, knowledge, or art, be offered for the structure of life plans? It is possible, of course that no general propositions obtain in respect to life plans, that each person's life plan has a different structure and coherence. The fact that people are at once similar and not identical suggests that some general forms or sets of general forms might be discerned.

I have proposed general forms for a number of significant rational ends and principles, principles such as morality and love, which have considerable implications for the shape of the life plan containing them. In Chapter Ten I propose some general propositions about the form of the life plan as it orders ends relative to questions of life and death. Perhaps these might be developed into a comprehensive theory of the form of life plans. I am content in this essay, however, to propose the existence of life plans and to sketch their rational structure only in respect to that one crucial issue.